Contingency in risk management : the case of pension funds in Sweden and Finland by Sorsa, Ville-Pekka & Roumpakis, Antonios
7.
169
Contingency in Risk Management:  
the Case of Pension Funds in Sweden 
and Finland
V il l e - Pekk a  S or S a  &  an tonioS  roumPakiS
IntroductIon
One of the key methods for providing understanding on the paradigms 
of social policy has been to classify different regimes according to their 
approaches to risk management. Esping-Andersen (1990) famously catego-
rised welfare states according to the levels of decommodification implied by 
the key institutions providing social protection to the citizens of the states. 
Within his classification, the Scandinavian welfare states topped the levels 
and were regarded as ‘universalist’, providing generous replacement levels on 
the basis of citizenship. Later, Esping-Andersen (1999) broadened his argu-
ments to broader political-economic foundations of modern welfare regimes, 
ultimately to the ideal type characteristics of policy-making. Various other 
scholars have as well combined institutions of policy-making with the insti-
tutions resulting from social policies. For example, there have been a great 
number of explicit critiques on Esping-Andersen’s classification supple-
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mented with alternative welfare state typologies (e.g. Bonoli, 2001; Castles, 
1993; Ferrera, 1996). 
The problem with Esping-Andersen’s as well as most of the alternative 
typologies is that although they bring political institutions and thus political 
contingencies into analysis of social risk management, they tend to ignore the 
practical aspects of risk management. Most importantly, these kinds of typol-
ogies do not usually take into account the social risks that risk management 
institutions generate. Indeed, risk management mechanisms not only respond 
to and reshape some underlying social risks, but also give new institutional 
forms to the old risks and create new and sometimes unpredicted forms of 
social risks. The management mechanisms often transmit the underlying risks 
to a more general level and may magnify them at this level (e.g. Beck, 1999; 
De Goede, 2004). This generates not only new kinds of social risks and other 
contingencies but also new kinds of political situations where risk manage-
ment issues are addressed. Indeed, risk management is always contingent and 
not without risks in itself, and it is thus absurd to study the policies and polit-
ical paradigms underlying the risk management institutions without studying 
how these institutions are governed and managed. 
We believe the issue of contingency must be addressed in any valid theory 
on politics of social risk management. If we ignore the questions of contin-
gency of the social risks and political contexts created by risk management 
institutions and the contingency of risk management more generally, both 
understanding of politics and especially the concrete politicisation of social 
risk management remain too abstracted. We thus need to bring the real-life 
operational contexts of risk management to the analysis on the politics of 
social risk if we wish such analysis to have real-life relevance. The primary 
purpose of this chapter is to see what kinds of contingencies are included in 
the risk management institutions tackling the social risks related to old age. 
Our analysis is focused on pension systems, or pension funds, to be more 
specific. 
Generally speaking, pension funds transform the social risk of failing to 
generate sufficient incomes for the period of old age into investment and other 
risks embedded in the funding mechanisms. The funding mechanisms are 
dependent on the nature of pension schemes at a more general level. For 
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example, ideal type collective defined benefit scheme (DB) models move 
individual risks to more collective level, as individual pensions are defined 
first and costs then adjusted, while the ideal type defined contribution (DC) 
schemes just changes the risks at the individual level, as pension contribu-
tions are fixed and pensions variable. The issue of pension fund governance, 
including for instance contribution collection, asset allocation and funding 
level decisions, is central for understanding the contingencies of social risk 
management wherever funded schemes exist. 
Funded, partially funded or prefunded pension systems are not only about 
alternative forms of arranging pension financing, but also about generating 
vast pools of capital that can be used in various different ways to achieve dif-
ferent kinds of social and economic policy targets. Pension funds are among 
the most significant sources of power in the beginning of 21st century (Goure-
vitch & Shinn, 2005), which is why it is difficult to choose any politically more 
relevant thematic area for the analysis of social risk management. That said, 
the academic social policy scholars have had quite limited interest in pen-
sion funds and especially investments even though most European countries 
have recently introduced funding components to their statutory systems. To 
borrow terminology from accounting, the comparative social policy studies 
have by and large focused on the ‘liability side’ (e.g. social functions, pension 
benefits) of pension provision, while the ‘asset side’ of pension provision has 
been somewhat neglected outside pension contribution levels. 
Our analysis is in nature a comparative case study, where the focus is on 
two Nordic countries, Sweden and Finland. To be more specific, we study 
the institutional differences in the liability and asset ‘sides’ of funding mech-
anisms of the funded mandatory earnings-related (first-pillar, second-tier) 
pension arrangements, the fully funded Swedish AP/PPM funds, and the 
Finnish partly funded TyEL scheme. The schemes have a massive scope in 
their welfare effects and share various institutional similarities. The Swedish 
scheme covers over 90 per cent of all working population, and the Finnish 
TyEL scheme covers approximately 1.5 million current private sector workers. 
The countries have been traditionally classified under the same variety of 
capitalism (mixed but coordinated market economies) and welfare regimes 
(social democratic, Nordic). In pension policy, the Finnish regime has been 
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understood to combine some aspects of the Swedish model with continental 
European paradigms (Hinrichs & Kangas, 2003). However, as our analysis 
suggests, when we study the contingencies in the both ‘sides’ of funding insti-
tutions, the differences are not that straightforward, and two pension systems 
are perhaps even more divergent in their social risk management paradigm.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the following section of the chapter, 
we present a very short overview on the development paths of social risk 
management in Swedish and Finnish pension regimes from the birth of the 
regimes to the recent reforms of the last few years from the perspective of 
social risk management. The birth and development of Finnish and Swedish 
national pension systems have already been well documented in the academic 
literature (see e.g. Niemelä et al., 1993; Niemelä, 1994; Salminen, 1987; Kangas, 
2006; Kangas et al., 2010; Heclo, 1975; Swenson, 2002; Esping-Andersen & 
Korpi, 1984; Korpi, 1983; Baldwin, 1990), which is why we do not discuss the 
issues here at the general level of pension reforms, but focus only on the risk 
management issues. In the third section, we discuss the contingencies in the 
current funding mechanisms in these two schemes, first from a general per-
spective of the funding mechanism and then more closely in both sides of 
the funding mechanisms, the assets and liabilities. In the fourth and the last 
section, we draw some conclusions on the Swedish and Finnish cases of risk 
management from a comparative perspective, and discuss the implications 
our analysis has concerning the politicisation of social risk management in 
both countries.
A short hIstory of socIAl rIsk mAnAgement In 
swedIsh And fInnIsh pensIon regImes
The introduction of the Swedish mandatory earnings-related pension system 
has been one of the best documented policy reforms in the international social 
policy literature as it exemplified the power struggle between labour market 
organisations, Social Democrats and bourgeois parties. This struggle was not 
only a battle over the issue of redistribution of the pension programme costs 
and benefits, but also an important struggle over the creation of publicly con-
trolled pension funds. The birth of the Finnish earnings pension regime had 
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many similarities but also more political and institutional “variables” than the 
Swedish reforms. The agrarian, bourgeois and fragmented left-wing interests 
also in fact drew the solutions to a somewhat different organisation of the 
scheme. Given these backgrounds, the starting point for the era of manda-
tory pension provision was perhaps surprisingly similar in both countries in 
context of social risk management. 
In broad-brush terms, the initial social risk management paradigm in the 
two pension regimes can be characterized from the perspective of private 
sector workers as follows. All (resident) citizens were guaranteed a low uni-
versal basic pension with which to cover the risks brought by old age. The first 
tier of the Swedish first-pillar system (folkpension), established in mid-1940s, 
provided a universal flat-rate benefit for all, as did the corresponding Finnish 
system (kansaneläke) established a decade later. On top of that, workers 
received a compensation for their loss of ability to work with an earnings-
related pension. The Swedish national supplementary earnings-related pen-
sion scheme ATP (Allmän Tilläggspension) legislation came into effect in 1960 
and the corresponding Finnish scheme TEL (Työntekijäin eläkelaki) in 1962. 
Earnings-related schemes in both countries were partly funded and financed 
by the employer contributions. They provided a defined benefit (DB) scheme 
that covered extremely high proportion of the working population. The ben-
efits were defined in Sweden by the average salary of fifteen most highly paid 
years, and in Finland by the final salary. Both schemes also generated assets 
in a unique scale for partly funded schemes.
There were a few institutional differences in the original form of the two 
pension regimes. In terms of social risk management, two differences were 
especially important. Firstly, the two Finnish mandatory first-pillar schemes 
crowded out nearly all occupational arrangements, which remained strong 
in Sweden. This suggests that although the political importance of the first-
pillar regime might have been high in both countries, the institutional impor-
tance of the first-pillar regime in overall social risk management related to 
the old-age was much more important in Finland. This difference was further 
strengthened in Sweden by the ceiling in first-pillar benefits and later in con-
tributions, neither of which have ever existed in Finland. These differences 
are crucial in political terms, as the Finnish earnings-related regime provides 
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the primary pension incomes for workers whereas the Swedish regime is only 
one albeit very significant component among others in the overall pension 
provision.
Secondly, the assets generated by the earnings-related schemes were organ-
ised and invested quite differently. The Swedish assets were decentralised 
to functionally divided, publicly controlled but somewhat autonomous AP 
funds. The original three AP funds were for instance not allowed to invest in 
equity, as employers feared the possibility of so-called ‘pension fund socialism’ 
(Overbye, 1996a; 1996b). The three original funds had tripartite boards with 
different representative weights in different funds. However, the fourth AP 
fund that was created in the 1970s was controlled by the employees and had 
a broader mandate to invest in equity and other assets. The investments were 
mostly made to so-called social investment targets and government bonds. 
In the Finnish case, the funds were decentralised to different privately 
controlled pension providers (pension insurance companies, company funds 
and industry-wide funds), which had first weak and later strong paritarian 
control with no public representation (see e.g. Johanson & Sorsa, 2010). The 
heavily solvency rule constrained investments consisted almost exclusively 
of so-called premium loans, in which the employers had the legal right to 
borrow a great part of the contributions (originally in form of paying the 
contributions in bonds). Put bluntly, the Swedish framework enabled social 
investments with publicly defined political targets, while the Finnish frame-
work kept capital purely in private hands and in private economic targets.
The risk management created by the regimes concerned the same issues, 
but in different ways. Both earnings-related schemes reshaped the social risks 
of old age and brought them to a systemic level. In both cases, some of these 
risks also materialised. In the Swedish case, the ATP scheme, including the 
investment targets and in some scale outcomes, was normatively very legiti-
mate throughout its existence. The main risk of the ATP scheme was related 
to the somewhat fixed contribution rates. In the initial stage, the contribu-
tion levels were set quite high in respect to the early benefit levels, and it 
was broadly assumed that these contribution rates would be sufficient as the 
scheme matured. Put simply, the risk of old-age income of all Swedish private 
sector workers was turned deliberately into the systemic risk of having insuf-
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ficient contribution rates and investment returns to pay for the DB old-age 
incomes.
The original levels of pension contributions indeed proved to be too low, 
and the investment returns were modest. Although both the first and second 
tier pension programmes showed remarkable institutional resilience, the pen-
sion system was considered, due to the severe economic depression of 1990s, 
not to be able to ever meet its social policy targets in the long run and to 
have become simply too expensive (see Palme, 2003; 2005; Selén & Ståhlberg, 
2007). We will present the scheme adopted in the reforms of 1990s in more 
detail below.
In the Finnish case, the social policy targets of the TEL (from 2007 TyEL) 
scheme have been achieved at least this far, and the ‘liability side’ risks in 
general have been controlled effectively. However, this has had less to do with 
the original scheme design than with the constant parametric changes in the 
scheme (see below). Lately, there have been some accusations that the social 
partners did not raise contribution rates early enough to keep the anticipated 
rises in control (there are now greater pressures than ever to raise the rates), 
but otherwise the scheme, including its governance system, has been consid-
ered legitimate. The risks in the original scheme were more related to legiti-
macy of investments than to pension provision. 
Indeed, the TEL scheme was not only supposed to manage the risks of old 
age, but also to provide private capital for real economic growth (Niemelä, 
1994). The risk here was that if the employers did not for some reason need 
the premium loans anymore, the system design did not enable pension pro-
viders to invest in high-risk high-yield targets due to solvency regulations. As 
Finland opened and liberalised the financial sector in late 1980s, the firms in 
fact had no more need for premium loans. The recession of the early 1990s 
made Finnish sovereign bonds a convenient investment target for TEL pro-
viders and thus postponed some reforms, but it was clear in mid-1990s that 
the institution of premium lending and thus the production of economic 
growth with TEL capital had exhausted – it couldn’t answer the policy goals 
given to it anymore.
Since the initial paradigm, there have been significant institutional changes 
in both regimes. There have been major institutional albeit not necessarily as 
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much paradigmatic changes in basic pensions. Both countries have not given 
up but strengthened universalism in the basic pension system by guaranteeing 
a basic pension for all over 65 years of age. In Sweden, the whole basic pen-
sion system was replaced by a guarantee pension, thus making the earnings-
related scheme primary source of pensions. On the other hand, the guarantee 
pension is subject to the rule of living in total 40 years in Sweden, which has 
in fact weakened the universalism understood as coverage of the scheme. The 
Finns continue having a universal basic pension system for all who have lived 
in Finland for more than three years (albeit lower in benefit levels if the pen-
sioner has lived abroad more than 20 per cent of his time after 16 years of age), 
which is now also complemented by the guarantee for all those that for some 
reason fall outside all pension schemes supplementing the basic scheme. The 
financing arrangements of basic pensions have been changed in both coun-
tries. Finland for instance recently abolished the employers’ contribution, thus 
making the scheme fully financed by taxes, and the amount of basic pension 
received has made subject to the earnings-related benefits received.
Arguably the most significant political changes have taken place in the 
earnings-related schemes. The Finnish scheme has been developed in par-
ametric style in numerous small reforms concerning the accrual of pen-
sions, indexation rules, and sharing of costs (see Hinrichs & Kangas, 2003). 
Perhaps most importantly, the scheme has changed from a classic final or 
average salary DB scheme into a defined accrual scheme, in which rights to 
benefits are accrued from the salaries as they are paid. The scheme has also 
been subject to pressures of financialisation in the ‘asset side’ and governance 
(see Sorsa, 2011). The investment rules have been changed for many times to 
improve the ability to invest in higher risk and more profitable investment 
targets internationally. The regulations concerning pension providers have 
been homogenised, the investment functions have been made more inde-
pendent, and the competition between pension insurance companies has been 
increased. As result, the legitimacy of the scheme has become somewhat more 
dependent on successes in international portfolio investments in the indi-
vidual provider level in order to keep costs lower and public opinion positive.
In contrast to parametric changes in the Finnish earnings-related scheme, 
the changes in the Swedish scheme have been systemic and quite radical in 
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terms of social risk management. The pension reform that came in effect 
in 2001 was from the perspective of pension provision a major path depar-
ture from the old prefunded DB system to a new partially funded notional 
defined contribution (NDC) scheme. This change moved much of the bearing 
of investment and contribution rate risks from collective system levels (state 
and employers) to individuals, that is, to their pension benefits that are very 
much dependent on long-term real investment performance. Many demo-
graphic components have been added to the pension formulas, and employees 
now also share costs with employers by paying contributions. The new earn-
ings-related scheme includes on top of the PAYG sponsored income pension 
a (small) fully funded premium pension (PPM) that is controlled by private 
asset managers according to employee choice. This suggests that a (small) part 
of pensions is directly dependent on the financial skills and even pure chance 
of the employee. The pension provision is no more in public decision-making 
but only regulated by a government agency.
To sum up, both regimes have somewhat changed in their old age risk 
management paradigms. Both mandatory and universal two-tier manda-
tory pension systems originally managed the social risks of old age by trans-
forming the individual risks to collective risks in forms of variable pension 
contributions and of investment returns. The Swedish regime shifted invest-
ment risks from the system level to individuals after the failure to adjust the 
contribution rates, and eliminated the risk of variable contribution rates 
to employers with a fixed contribution rate. The institutional changes were 
broad. The Finnish regime has individualised some risks and changed the 
nature of collective risks by changing parameters in the pension formulas 
but without giving up the original risk management paradigm or reforming 
the institutional arrangement thoroughly. The Swedish case illustrates a very 
clear change in generating new risks, while changes in the Finnish regime 
remain more modest. Albeit in different forms in relation to social risk, the 
proficient operations of both regimes have nevertheless become equally much 
dependent on the performance of international portfolio investments. Next, 
we discuss the current form of risk management embedded in the funding 
mechanisms of these two systems in more detail.
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Assets And lIAbIlItIes: the fundIng mechAnIsms
The current funding mechanisms of the Swedish AP funds and Finnish TyEL 
providers have many similarities. After all, they are both partly and collec-
tively funded schemes that are very much reliant on the PAYG elements. Yet 
some visible differences remain when we look at some of the key accounting 
and administration issues of the pension formulas and funding mechanisms. 
Indeed, these differences are important in terms of understanding the contin-
gency in risk management, both in terms of generation of risks and in terms 
of formal governance of risk management. 
In the Swedish prefunded AP scheme, the logics of accounting follow a 
notional capitalised pension model. In a pure DC model, the liabilities (that 
is, the pension benefits) are defined as the workers retire from the overall 
capital accumulated, the paid contributions with investment yields. In the 
Swedish AP scheme, however, the capital is accumulated so that the contri-
butions are given a notional interest rate that is dependent on the growth of 
average earnings (see Barr & Diamond, 2011). In a pure DC model, all the 
inflowing pension contributions are in principle invested in financial markets. 
In the Swedish AP system, most of the contributions (around 90 per cent) 
are directly used to pay the AP pension benefits, while only the contributions 
exceeding the liabilities (around 10 per cent of contributions) are channelled 
to investments. The fund assets are thus used only to ensure the liquidity and 
long-term sustainability of the scheme. The capital is not invested through 
individual accounts or even within constraints provided by individual liabili-
ties as in DC schemes but via pooled capital. This suggests that the key con-
tingency related to the funding mechanism is how these buffer funds can exist 
sustainably in the first place – put simply, if they turn negative, there aren’t 
enough contributions to pay for the pensions, and the pensions must be cut.
The accounting logic of the Finnish TyEL scheme can be in part consid-
ered inverse to the AP system. In contrast to a prefunded scheme, the TyEL 
would be better characterised as a permanently under-funded scheme. In sim-
plified terms, if the funds are not sufficient (as they never are) to pay the indi-
vidual’s pension, the (always certain) deficiency can be covered by variable 
collective contribution rates. The accounting model is not based on capitalisa-
179
tion as employees retire, but individuals’ liabilities are generated (that is, pen-
sion rights are accrued) throughout the working career. The accounting of lia-
bilities is individual-based until the employee reaches the age of 54 after which 
the contributions are pooled. The individual liabilities are again defined and 
settled between providers when the pension decision is made. The individual 
liabilities are paid first from the funded component and when this capital runs 
out, then by a collective PAYG component. Although the pooling technique 
brings a flavour of buffer funding to the scheme, most of the liabilities are 
individually accounted in each pension provider, which provides constraints 
for investment choices through solvency regulations. (Sorsa, 2011.)
Put bluntly, in Sweden the PAYG component is primary and in Finland 
secondary in the ‘marching order’ of accounting flows. Although this dif-
ference and the more general difference between NDC and defined accrual 
scheme may seem only technical, they are quite essential in defining the polit-
ical and the technical flexibility of social risk management. It is thus worth 
elaborating the contingencies in the ‘asset side’ of the schemes, the invest-
ments and contribution rates, and to the ‘liability side’ of the schemes, the 
pension benefits, in some more detail.
The asset side: contributions and investments
In case of contributions, there has been a clear choice in the Swedish scheme 
to fix the rates to a certain level. Basically this means that the costs of this 
mode of risk management are fixed while the management mechanism itself 
has to be flexible. From the perspective of employers and employees as con-
tributors, the costs of old-age social risk management are thus fixed and can 
be anticipated long to the future – it is the benefits and investments that are 
adjusted if necessary. If the contribution rates were to be changed, it would 
call for a review of the entire scheme by the so-called Pensions Committee or, 
ultimately, the government and the parliament. The lack of flexibility within 
contribution rates also designates less room for policy manoeuvre in the 
Swedish labour markets, putting pressure solely on AP funds to outperform 
its targets in order to cover for the too low contributions. 
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The Finnish scheme has an inverse logic: the risk management mechanism 
is fixed but its costs are not. The accrued benefits are protected by the consti-
tutionally enforced property right and thus cannot be adjusted but through 
very specific mechanisms (see below). So, it is the contribution rates that 
must be adjusted when necessary. Both the employers and the employees pay 
contributions, the former covering around three and the latter one fourth 
of the overall contribution rate (at the time of writing 27.2–29 per cent of 
monthly salary). Formally, the Ministry for Social and Health Affairs sets the 
contribution rates annually based on legally enforced calculative formulas, 
which would suggest that the contribution rates vary directly according to 
the changes in pension payments. In practice, however, the pension providers 
and the Centre for Pensions first set the bases for the calculative formulas and 
prepare the calculations before the rates are actually set, which makes the 
contribution rates somewhat contingent. Furthermore, the pension providers 
can (and must) use a part of their investment profits to customer compen-
sations for the employer-contributors, which makes a part of the contribu-
tion rates even further contingent. That said, the most significant long-term 
contingency concerning the development of the contribution rates is that all 
solutions, including the sharing of costs between employers and employees, 
are ultimately subject to the decision-making by the social partners and other 
actors in the field (Johanson & Sorsa, 2010). 
Although there are adjustment mechanisms for benefits (see below), the 
long-term investment performance is crucial in defining the financial and 
social sustainability of the Swedish scheme. Because contributions are fixed, 
the AP investment activities must be flexible in order to optimize investment 
portfolios to compensate for the possible failures of the funding mechanism in 
the long run. It is thus hardly a surprise that the investment mandates of the 
AP funds are based on quite flexible principle-based regulations albeit with 
a few direct rules concerning the investments. In the AP1–4 funds, all listed 
and transferable capital market instruments are in principle allowed with the 
exception of commodity investments.
However, at least 30 per cent of assets must be invested in low-risk fixed 
income instruments and 10 per cent of assets must be managed by external 
managers, and there are various allocation ceilings (concerning currency risk, 
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single security issuers, unlisted securities, Swedish listed company owner-
ship, and more general single entity ownership). Despite these rulings, the 
sustainability of the AP scheme is very much dependent on the investment 
performance, and thus the skills of the portfolio managers and the overall 
international financial market development. When taking the premium pen-
sions into account, the selection of investors of individual accounts further 
highlights the issue of financial skills as a crucial factor of risk management 
in the Swedish scheme. The universal application of personal choice over pen-
sion fund investment shifts the risks to individuals regardless of their finan-
cial literacy, resources available to monitor market volatility or their skills in 
calculating financial risks.22
In the Finnish scheme, the individual providers’ mandate to choose invest-
ment targets is broad, complemented with various rules and ceilings con-
cerning the investment activities as in the Swedish case. However, the funding 
mechanism and other regulations further limit the investment activities sig-
nificantly in various ways, both quantitatively and qualitatively (see Sorsa, 
2011, for details). For example of the former, the solvency rules directly con-
trol the availability of assets to be invested and the proper overall risk levels 
of the investments, and make the providers interdependent on each others’ 
choices (in a ‘game theoretical’ manner). For example of the latter, the usage 
of mandated external managers (excluding fund investments) is completely 
forbidden.
Although there are no major obstacles for making investment activities 
more flexible institutionally, the key issue here is that they don’t need to be 
flexible in order to manage the sustainability of the scheme in the long run – it 
is sufficient to adjust the pension contribution rates that are used to comple-
ment the pension payments when the funded assets are not enough to cover 
the payments. It is, of course, evident that long-term investment perform-
ance affects all contribution rates in the TyEL scheme. From the perspective 
of effectively sustainable social risk management, however, the number one 
issue is how the contribution rates are adjusted. 
22  So far the attempt to establish such mass investment culture based on individuals’ capacity 
to manage financial risk has been considered somewhat problematic (see Belfrage & Ryner, 
2009; Belfrage in this volume).
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Indeed, the key difference in the flexibility of the asset side of the two 
schemes is that they give flexibility to different sources of income, which also 
includes many asymmetries and has important implications concerning the 
politics of risk management. In Sweden, flexibility is sought by empowering 
investors, the AP funds, which are made the crucial actors in defining the 
sustainability of the overall functioning of the scheme, while no flexibility on 
the contribution rates. This is in contrast to the idea of AP funds as ‘buffer 
funds’ – the failure to achieve sufficient investment return is a social risk that 
may lead to the lowering of pension benefits. As the AP funds are directly 
responsible for the level of pension benefits, it would be wrong to call AP 
funds merely buffer funds. It must be noted, of course, that the funds are 
only responsible for the downside risks, not any kind of ‘upside risks’ – good 
investment performance does not increase pensions.
While the contribution rates in the Finnish TyEL scheme will change 
automatically as the pension liabilities increase, the social partners can con-
trol the stability of this rise by deciding to ‘frontload’ expected increases or 
decreases of costs by agreeing on adjusting the funded amount of contribu-
tions. The Finnish scheme empowers social partners, while the investments 
remain just a matter of lowering the costs of the scheme. In fact, the good 
investment performance translates only into customer compensations for the 
employers (which affect employee contributions in the long run as well) while 
bad investment performance does not, at least directly, imply any changes in 
contributions. 
These differences in the ‘politics of the asset side’ in the two countries 
directly shift focus on the governance and accountability of these schemes. 
Take for example incentives. In case of investments, the Finnish TyEL pro-
viders are accountable for positively lowering the pension costs of their cus-
tomers, while the Swedish AP funds are accountable only negatively for 
avoiding the cuts in their customers’ pensions. In other words, the Finnish 
scheme structurally provides mostly carrots for developing accountability 
in investment activities while the Swedish scheme only provides sticks. The 
Finnish investors have all the reasons to show that they perform well whatever 
the market situations while the Swedish investors have good reasons to try 
to shift the blame to financial markets when things go wrong. These are with 
183
no doubt significant differences when we think about the social legitimacy of 
these schemes. We will return to other governance, legitimacy, and account-
ability issues in the conclusions section.
The liability side: pension benefits, adjustments and formulas
When it comes to the definition of pension benefits, both schemes share a 
great variety of contingencies thematically – it is just the mechanisms and 
their roles that differ. In the Swedish scheme, the pensions accrue from the 
paid contributions, and the accrued amounts are indexed to the development 
of average Swedish wage levels. As the pensions are annuitised, the estima-
tion of the pension benefit is calculated based on an annuity divisor with each 
birth cohort and each retirement age having a specific divisor that directly 
links pension benefits with life expectancy rates, average ages for men and 
women recalculated each year. After determining the amount of the pension 
benefit, this amount is each year calculated based on the annual growth of 
real wages minus a fixed 1.6 per cent interest rate that supposedly captures the 
long-term real wage growth. This means for example that if the income index 
increases by exactly 1.6 percentage points more than inflation, as measured 
by the Consumer Price Index, pensions will increase at exactly the same rate 
as inflation. If the increase is lower or higher than 1.6 percentage points, there 
will be a loss or increase respectively of real income.23 In order for pensioners 
to see an increase of their pension, average growth rates should exceed infla-
tion rates and on top of this the fixed 1.6 per cent interest rate. 
In the Finnish case, the pensions accrue from salaries variably according 
to age. For those under 53 years, the accrual rate is 1.5 per cent of the annual 
wage sum. For those between 53 and 63 years, the rate is 1.9 per cent, and 
for those between 63 and 68 years, it is 4.5 per cent. The latter, the so-called 
23  The change in the index consists of two parts. The first is the average annual change in 
average income for the latest three-year period, excluding inflation; the second is inflation for 
the latest 12-month period ending in June. Pension qualifying income is not known until after 
the final tax assessment, i.e. in December of the year following the income year. This means that 
the income for the two most recent years is based on estimates. Errors in estimates are corrected 
in the indices for subsequent years. (See Pensionsmyndigheten, 2010, for further details.) 
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‘super-accrual’, provides strong incentives to have longer working careers. The 
indexation of accrued pension is arranged so that 80 per cent of the accrued 
pension is dependent on the overall wage development and 20 per cent on 
the consumer price index changes. After the initial pension is set, the amount 
of future pension benefits is adjusted in collective terms in Finland as well. 
There are at least two key mechanisms in play here. Firstly, the amount of 
annual pensions is dependent on the consumer price inflation (80 per cent of 
the change) and the changes in the real wage levels (20 per cent). This reflects 
the idea that the purchase power of the pension is more important than the 
changes in for example labour market conditions and productivity growth. 
Secondly, the annual pensions are dependent on the expected longevity of an 
age cohort. Currently it seems that the pension benefits will be lower for the 
future generations than initially expected due to increasing longevity.
Indeed, the two pension schemes have many similarities when looking at 
the risks related to the accrual of sufficient mandatory earnings-related pen-
sions. Looking at the issue from the perspective of risks during individuals’ 
working careers, failing to accrue pension is in both countries dependent on 
the employment record and wage levels from which pensions are accrued. 
Looking at the issue from a system-level standpoint, there are again strong 
similarities in the accrual mechanism. In both countries, the accrual is 
dependent first on the development in average earnings (albeit less in Finland, 
in which it is also dependent on consumer price inflation) and, as the pension 
is annuitised, then on the life expectancy rates of the birth and age cohort. 
If the average salaries in the Swedish and Finnish economies do not rise but 
the life expectancy does, it will mean lower accrued pensions for workers in 
respective countries independent of the working career or salary level track 
records of these individuals. When looking at the accrual of pensions, there 
are only two important differences in the two regimes: the Swedish premium 
pension system makes accrual of pension in part dependent on individuals’ 
financial skills in that regime, and the ‘super accrual’ incentive makes working 
in the last years of the working career especially important in Finland.
Some similarities exist between the countries also at the moment of annui-
tisation of the accrued pensions. The Swedish annuity divisor refers to an 
adjusted estimate of the expected period of pension-drawing based on the 
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birth year and the average life expectancy in accordance with the demo-
graphic trends and medical advances.  The divisor is calculated separately 
for each age cohort. In Finland, a similar life expectancy adjustment factor is 
calculated for each age cohort in the age of 62 on the basis of last five years’ 
mortality rates. While the differences in accrual and annuitisation of pensions 
between the two regimes are significant albeit nuanced, we can find major dif-
ferences only when we look at the question of how the already accrued (that 
is, final) pensions are adjusted ex post facto over time and how this affects 
individuals’ pensions in real value. 
For example, the changes in life the overall real wage development affect 
the pensions in both countries. In the Finnish case, however, the effects of the 
development is very limited, as real wages affect only 20 per cent of annual 
adjustments (80 per cent is defined by consumer prices index). In Sweden, the 
effects can range from ignorable to ones with utmost importance. The effects 
of the somewhat arbitrary ‘real wages minus 1.6 per cent’ indexation rule are 
quite difficult to anticipate, as it is fully dependent on the development of the 
relationship between wage levels and inflation. 
The Finnish TyEL scheme has no other adjustment mechanisms for the 
final pensions besides the ones already mentioned, and thus the adjustments 
of the pension benefits after annuitisation remains rather stable although. The 
Swedish AP scheme in contrast includes a ‘brake mechanism’ that automati-
cally balances the relation between assets (the value of future contributions 
plus the cumulative returns from fund investments) and liabilities (future pen-
sion obligations), which is activated whenever the balance between assets and 
liabilities falls below 1. This is with no doubt the key difference between the 
two regimes in the ‘liability side’ of pensions. The Swedish ‘brake mechanism’ 
affects benefits according to living expectancy age per birth cohorts, labour 
market conditions, and even immigration rates (Första AP-Fonden, 2007). 
The balance mechanism is thus prone to be activated on several accounts. 
For example, in the aftermath of the US subprime crisis, in 2008, invest-
ment returns averaged -21.3 per cent, and the brake mechanism was activated 
by removing any indexation in both pension accrual and benefits (Sundén, 
2009). However, while financial markets recovered and the profitability of the 
AP funds was restored, the Swedish labour market still faced lower employ-
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ment levels and therefore low overall wage increases in 2009. During 2009 
and for the first semester of 2010 there was a substantial change in the actual 
funding of the schemes since the net inflows from the National Insurance 
Board (RFV) pension system (i.e. the net of incoming pension contribu-
tions minus pension disbursements) was negative. The labour market con-
ditions and the economic recession reduced the funded buffer despite finan-
cial recovery, and the pensioners started to expect lower retirement income.24 
It could be argued that employment actually remains the first and foremost 
influential factor for the financial stability of the balance ratio with net immi-
gration and birth rates mostly boosting the contribution base of the system. 
Low contributions channelled in the system as well as negative returns from 
the buffer funds may continue activating the balance mechanism in the future, 
with contributors and pensioners losing even more through indexation with-
drawals.
24  Benefits will be affected in 2011 and 2012. The deficit in the system affects indexation with a 
lag (see Sundén, 2009).
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tAble 1: mechanisms potentially causing lower-than-sufficient annual real value 
earnings-related pensions in the swedish and finnish first pillar schemes.
Scheme swedIsh Ap & ppm fInnIsh tyel
Source of risks
Individual Collective/system Individual
Collective/
systemLocation of 
contingency
Accrual of ini-
tial pension 
(a priori)
Too short employ-
ment track 
record, too low 
salaries
PPM: low invest-
ment perform-
ance
Decrease in 
national average 
earnings
Too short employ-
ment track record, 
failure to benefit 
‘super accrual’ 
incentives, too low 
salaries
Fall of national 
average earn-
ings below 
consumer price 
inflation
Annuitisation 
of the pension
Increase in overall 
life expectancy
Increase in 
overall life 
expectancy
Adjustment of 
pension ben-
efits 
(a posteriori)
Decrease in average 
earnings; activa-
tion of the “brake 
mechanism” 
(decrease in invest-
ment returns, 
decrease in employ-
ment rates, longer 
life expectancy, 
lower immigration 
rates etc.)
Fall of national 
average earn-
ings radically 
below consumer 
price inflation
All in all, the differences between the Swedish and the Finnish earnings-
related schemes are summarised in Table 1 in terms of potential negative 
effects to annual pensions and, to be more specific, of potential causes that 
can lead to lower-than-sufficient pensions (sufficiency being a political ques-
tion as such, of course). Perhaps the key difference between the Finnish and 
the Swedish ‘liability side contingencies’ is that the annual amount of pensions 
in Sweden can be very significantly adjusted also with ex post facto mecha-
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nisms, while the major Finnish adjustments are limited only to the accrual 
and annuitisation stages. From the perspective of social risk management par-
adigm, the difference is with no doubt crucial. The Swedish scheme is not nec-
essarily that effective in managing social risks of pensioners, but rather those 
of employers and workers (see Barr & Diamond, 2011). The Finnish scheme 
in contrast effectively insures against the social risks of old age, but keeps the 
division of costs between the employers and the employees an open question. 
That said, if we look at the key contingencies in both paradigms more 
closely, we can see that it is the same social issues that affect the pensions: 
national employment rates (not just own employment or the success of one’s 
own employer), overall (not just personal) wage levels that define the indexa-
tion of accrual and benefits, life expectancy of all citizens (not just workers), 
birth rates and immigration rates, and all other kinds of issues affecting the 
basic economic and social conditions of the society. What is easily forgotten 
here is that automatic adjustments based on these factors are never automatic 
in the sense that you cannot affect them politically. It just means that the 
management of the social risks of the old age are made dependent on more 
system-level issues and, as result, it has been made dependent on more gen-
eral-level employment, economic, labour market, health, immigration and 
other national policies. It is not just the risks the individuals face, but also the 
failures in these policy areas that the pension system as a mode of risk man-
agement answers to. In the Swedish case, it is the pensioners who pay the bill 
for national policy failures unless the funds can compensate for these failures 
with exceptional investment performance. In Finland, the bill of national fail-
ures is not paid by pensioners but the contributors (that is, the operating firms 
and employees) whose share of the bill can be negotiated. The employers’ bill 
is further dependent on the investment performance of the pension providers. 
These issues and linkages may give the governance of these schemes much 
more political flavour than the issues that seem to be rather technical pen-
sion system design issues. For example, the Finnish scheme provides labour 
unions as well as employer organisations a strong incentive to cooperate in 
contexts of both national economic policy and of the pension system devel-
opment in order to avoid rapid growth of pension contributions whatever the 
reason for the rise (e.g. low employment rates, high wage increases, too low 
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long-term investment performance). Furthermore, the Finnish pension gov-
ernance system, which has paritarian elements at every level (see Johanson 
& Sorsa, 2010), has a strong potential for increasing solidarity between indi-
vidual firms and employee groups. The Swedish system does not quite pro-
vide similar positive incentives. Rather, it provides individual employers an 
incentive to compete on skilled labour with generous second pillar pension 
schemes and, as is the case with employees, to question the legitimacy of the 
rather expensive first pillar scheme whenever pension benefits are cut.
conclusIons: key Issues for  
re-polItIcIsIng the pensIon systems
The Swedish and Finnish mandatory earnings-related pension schemes we 
have discussed in this chapter illustrate a great variety of similarities and dif-
ferences in the contingencies they generate for the risk management. To end 
the chapter, we discuss some of the key political issues and challenges these 
differences generate in the respective schemes and countries. The difference 
between the two schemes can be quite feasibly approached with a few simple 
questions. Perhaps most importantly, there is the simple question of what 
can you do if the scheme ‘runs out of money’, that is, if assets are not enough 
to meet the liabilities. This is not the only important question, however. One 
must also ask who is accountable for the performance of the scheme and how, 
and what kind of incentives you have for improving the sustainability of the 
risk management paradigm. We will shed light over these questions and high-
light some key issues that should be tackled when re-politisizing the schemes 
in respective countries.
In Finland, running out of assets to meet liabilities is very unlikely to 
happen due to strict solvency and liquidity controls, and the simple ‘bal-
ancing mechanism’ of pension liabilities reducing whenever employment 
or wage levels fall. Moreover, if it for some reason is expected to happen, 
it just implies rather automatic increase in contribution rates for the next 
year. While the TyEL scheme is considered socially quite legitimate and sus-
tainable (see TELA, 2010), few employers and not that many employees are 
willing to accept higher pension contribution rates. The increasing contribu-
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tion rates have raised some concerns over the justice of generational redistri-
bution, and there have been even some demands for ceilings in contribution 
rates. These dispositions, and the fact that the scheme delivers primary pen-
sions for nearly all Finns, have lead to constant re-politicisation of individual 
institutions affecting the costs of the scheme. Given the automatic increase in 
contributions rates when decisions might be pending, the Finnish solution 
is politically empowering in the sense that the sustainability of the scheme 
are matters of contingent decision-making over individual institutions of the 
scheme, not questions dependent solely on investment returns available from 
financial markets or on the pension incomes of the masses as in the Swedish 
case. 
That said, it must be noted that the development of the TyEL system is 
dependent on the ability to find consensus or otherwise agree on politicized 
issues concerning the institutions of the field. As the field of TyEL provi-
sion is filled with various administrative, political and institutional tensions 
(see Johanson & Sorsa, 2010; Sorsa & Johanson, 2011), the overall proficiency 
of risk management is at a very general level dependent on the agreement 
between the key actors of the field. In practice, there are no institutional-
ised bodies that would ensure agreement, but all negotiations are based on 
ad hoc negotiation group arrangements. Although a first-pillar scheme, even 
the roles of the government and the parliament have been very limited in 
the development of the scheme. The role of social partners is in contrast cru-
cial: no change is possible without them agreeing, approving and initiating it. 
While the Finnish scheme is positively prone to re-politicisation, the actual 
politics of the scheme are often filled with problems and ambiguities. There is 
no rigorous political or at least democratic accountability in decision-making. 
Neither have the main political parties any political incentives to take over 
the decision-making from the social partners, because it would imply loss 
of support from employer and employee federations and unions. In case the 
decisions would decrease pension security, it is convenient for parties to leave 
decision-making to the social partners.
Lately, there have been major difficulties in finding agreement over the 
development of the scheme, the main issue on the table being the formal 
minimum retirement age (currently 63 for old-age pension). One reason for 
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the difficulties lies in the opposing views of employers and employees. The 
previous would like to raise the age, while the latter opposes it and highlights 
the importance of ‘super accrual’ incentives and of raising the de facto retire-
ment age (which is closer to 60) with informal measures and policies. Another 
reason concerns the groups or committees in which these issues have been 
discussed. The mandates that the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has set 
for the negotiation groups have been all but fit for purpose. 
At a more general level, the main political challenge for finding agreement 
has been the change in collective bargaining cultures. Formerly the pension 
system development issues were a part of the annual tripartite bargaining 
over incomes policy (usually called TUPO). The potential erosion of the cen-
tral bargaining may increase ‘ad-hoc-ism’, and might make it more difficult to 
get the social partners around the same table with the state, as the partners 
are already discussing the key issues within the field in various arrangements. 
The state has, for example, very few concessions in tax policies and economic 
policy left to lure the employers to ad hoc development efforts. This provides 
incentives for the government to take direct action, which may distance the 
parliament from social partners even further. Indeed, while the institutions 
of the Finnish scheme are constantly prone to re-politicisation, it does not 
imply that the politics would be democratically accountable, deliberative, or 
without significant tensions.
If there is something characteristic to the politics of the Swedish AP/
PPM scheme, it is the aim at de-politicisation of all individual institutions 
and variables within the pension scheme. The organisation of the decision-
making over the sustainability of the scheme aims at avoiding the re-politi-
cisation of pension governance by placing the system on an ‘automatic trail’. 
The main question with the Swedish scheme is what happens if or when some 
of the parameters (fewer contributions, low or negative AP funds investment 
returns, decline of wage growth, increase of inflation rates etc.) remain unfa-
vourable towards the increase of AP/PPM scheme assets. Given that the con-
tribution rates are fixed, the room for policy manoeuvre is all but spacious. It 
is all about deciding how pensions are cut – about adjusting individual param-
eters of the brake mechanism, which will cut pensions in any case. Albeit that 
the AP/PPM is only one scheme among many in providing the overall pen-
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sion income, this makes the whole scheme vulnerable to system-level con-
testation. Indeed, in the AP/PPM scheme, the social risks are not shared and 
costs redistributed if necessary, but only elevated at the systemic level.
The paradigm of de-politicisation has been present in the governance as 
well. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the Swedish government 
reformed the so-called Pension Committee, which was originally put together 
for the creation of AP/PPM scheme, to discuss issues on generosity levels and, 
essentially, why the AP funds suffered such severe losses during the financial 
crisis. The Committee is comprised by technical experts, political party repre-
sentatives25 and does not include any member from unions or employer asso-
ciations. Although the government is delegating experts to find solutions (for 
how to cut pensions if necessary, or how to gain better investment returns), 
accountability is spread among the major political parties and the political 
system as a whole – it is not directed to experts. For example, the indexation 
from contribution accruals and pension benefits was removed with the Pen-
sion Committee decision to activate the brake mechanism in the aftermaths 
of the financial crisis, and the government abided. But will this affect the 
popularity of the government, the whole AP/PPM scheme, or perhaps the AP 
fund directors? While it is impossible to anticipate the results, it is clear that 
the government is the only one that can be affected through democratic vote.
The pressure on the sustainability of the AP/PPM scheme lays on the con-
tinuation of wage growth and increase of employment levels, but also on the 
satisfactory returns of the AP funds. As the system is incorporating employ-
ment levels and wage growth within the calculation for pension benefits, the 
employers have no incentives to increase employment levels, as there are no 
gains in the case of an AP/PPM surplus. Neither is there any indication that 
the Swedish government would be willing to take an active and intervening 
role towards the increase of pension assets or shifting the investment prin-
ciples of AP funds. So it must be asked, would flexibility in the contribution 
rates be completely unfeasible for employers or politically unacceptable for 
the employees? While this would with no doubt relieve the negative contin-
gencies of the risk management, it is difficult find political incentives for this 
25  The Left (ex-communist) party opposed the reform and did not participate in the 
committee. 
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happening. There is no clear indication why employers would be interested 
in increasing their contributions towards the AP/PPM scheme in the first 
place, since they continue to fund second-pillar occupational pensions for 
their employees, which can be used as a means for competition. 
These issues show that in comparison to the Finnish scheme, there are very 
few incentives for actually developing the sustainability and to control the 
contingencies of risk management in Sweden – if the system fails, there are no 
incentives for employers or employees to increase contribution rates. Unless 
the government changes fundamentally its approach towards the regulation 
and sustainability of the scheme, a failure to meet a politically and socially 
acceptable retirement income will be transformed into a systemic questioning 
of the AP/PPM scheme, and possibly another epic reform of the system. 
To end the chapter, it is worth noting that when we combine both the asset 
and the liability sides of pensions as risk management in the two countries, 
we can see that they provide different buttons to push in economic policy. 
Both pension schemes are in nature pro-cyclic, but in a very different manner. 
When a combined financial and economic downturn hits, the Swedish AP/
PPM will react to it by lowering pensions of nearly all Swedish pensioners, 
while the Finnish TyEL scheme mildly increases the pension contribution 
rates for all employers and employees (unless otherwise distributed). In 
Sweden, this means that the effective real demand of the economy falls, which 
decreases expectations and makes it difficult to find new real investments, 
and thus ultimately slows down the emergence of any growth prospects. In 
Finland, it mostly means that at least labour-intensive new productive initia-
tives and real investments become slightly more expensive, which is hardly a 
disaster. However, it also gives incentives to cut down jobs, which may lower 
effective demand and lead to lower pensions in the long run. 
Although it is a matter of theoretical economics to evaluate which one is 
worse, the decrease in effective demand or higher costs of supply, it is clear that 
the optimal economic policy (both preventive policies and policy responses) 
is very different in the two countries if we increase our understanding on pen-
sions. This is ultimately what the contingency in risk management is all about 
in the first place – without understanding these contingencies, it only leads to 
false understanding on social risks and their politics.
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